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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This appeal arises out of an alleged breach of a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release

("Settlement Agreement") entered into between Appellant Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") and
Respondent Allan Ward ("Ward"), individually and on behalf of his company, Little Moo Cattle
Company, LLC ("Little Moo"), in connection with a prior lawsuit venued in Cassia County, Case
No. CV 2016-859 ("underlying lawsuit"). Confidential R. 5-11. On information and belief, the
Settlement Agreement was executed by Primera, Ward, and their respective counsel. 1 Confidential
R. 9. For Primera, the Settlement Agreement was executed by Dustin Dean and by its attorney,
Gary Slette of Robertson & Slette, PLLC. For Ward and Little Moo, the Settlement Agreement
was executed by Ward and his attorney, R. Keith Roark ("Roark") of The Roark Law Firm.
Confidential R. 9. The Settlement Agreement included a confidentiality and non-disparagement
clause. Confidential R. 8.
After the Settlement Agreement was executed, Roark continued to represent Ward in a
related criminal proceeding then pending in Cassia County. Confidential R. 2. In an apparent effort
to have the criminal charges dismissed, Roark sent a letter to the Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia
County wherein he notified the Prosecuting Attorney of the parties' settlement in the underlying

1

Ward does not have in his possession a fully-executed version of the Settlement
Agreement, nor has one been provided in discovery. Confidential R. 2. Ward reserves any and all
arguments that he may have regarding the validity and/or finality of the Settlement Agreement
until he is provided a fully executed copy. Ward assumes only for the sake of this appeal and the
underlying motion for summary judgment and motion for reconsideration that the Settlement
Agreement was fully executed.

1

lawsuit. R. 52-53. The letter had not been authorized or reviewed by Ward. Confidential R. 2-3.
Ward did not know about the letter until this lawsuit was filed against him. Confidential R. 2.
Primera's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") asserts a single cause of
action against Ward for breach of the Settlement Agreement and seeks liquidated damages in the
amount of$25,000. R. 12-15, Confidential R. 8. This claim is based solely on Roark's letter to the
Prosecuting Attorney. R. 13-14. The district court granted summary judgment in Ward's favor on
the grounds that Roark was acting outside the scope of his authority when he disclosed confidential
terms of the Settlement Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney, and thus there was no genuine
issue of material fact with respect to whether Ward breached the Settlement Agreement. R. 98-102.
Primera then filed a motion for reconsideration. R. 104-105. The district court denied Primera's
motion for reconsideration and reiterated its prior holding that there was no genuine issue of
material fact that Roark acted without express or implied authority. R. 123-125.
On appeal, Primera has failed to establish that the district court erred. Consequently, the
district court's ruling should be affirmed.

B.

Concise Statement of Facts
On or about October 3, 2016, Primera filed the underlying lawsuit arising out of the

purchase and sale of Wagyu calves. R. 13, Confidential R. 6. Primera and Ward resolved the
underlying lawsuit by way of a Settlement Agreement entered into on or about November 1O,
2016. R. 13, Confidential R. 6-11. The Settlement Agreement included the following
confidentiality and non-disparagement provision:
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Except as otherwise required by this Agreement, law, or order of a court of
competent jurisdiction, the parties shall keep the terms of this Agreement strictly
confidential. The parties further agree that neither shall hereafter disparage the
name or character of the other in any way. Each party agrees that it will not make
any negative or derogatory comments to the media, to their colleagues, or to any
members of the public concerning the other party, or any of their respective past or
present officers, members or directors. The remedy for any breach of this provision
shall be the recovery of liquidated damages incurred as a result of such breach at
the rate of $25,000.00 per occurrence.
Confidential R. 8. The Settlement Agreement was executed by Gary Slette (attorney for Primera),
Dustin Dean (for Primera), Ward (individually and on behalf of Little Moo), and Roark (attorney
for Ward and Little Moo). Confidential R. 9. The underlying lawsuit was dismissed on
November 16, 2016. Confidential R. 2.
Meanwhile, a separate criminal matter was pending against Ward in Cassia County on
charges related to the facts giving rise to the underlying lawsuit. Confidential R. 2. Approximately
two months after the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement, Roark unilaterally sent a letter
to the Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia County, dated January 9, 2017, asserting the criminal case
should be dismissed because the underlying lawsuit had settled. R. 52-53. In support of this
assertion, Roark disclosed certain terms of the confidential Settlement Agreement. Id.
Ward had not authorized, requested, or directed Roark to disclose terms of the Settlement
Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney. Confidential R. 2. Ward did not know about the letter until
this lawsuit was filed against him. Confidential R. 2-3. Ward has not personally disclosed any
terms of the Settlement Agreement and did not ask or authorize his attorney to do so. Confidential
R. 2-3, R. 49, 59.
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C.

Course of Proceedings
Primera filed its Complaint on March 13, 2017, claiming Ward breached the terms of the

Settlement Agreement. R. 12-15. Ward filed his Answer and Counterclaim on April 24, 2017.
R. 16-25. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the district court entered an order
dismissing Ward's counterclaim with prejudice on May 21, 2018. R. 86-87.
On May 3, 2018, Ward filed a motion for summary judgment, along with a memorandum
in support. R. 34-47. In his supporting memorandum, Ward argued he had not breached the
Settlement Agreement because Roark acted outside the scope of his authority when he sent the
letter to the Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney and, further, the liquidated damages clause of the
Settlement Agreement serves as a penalty, and is therefore void and unenforceable under Idaho
law. R. 41-46. In conjunction with his motion for summary judgment, Ward submitted a
declaration of counsel attaching as exhibits the Roark letter and Plaintiffs Response to
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff,
served March, 29, 2018. R. 48-64. Ward also submitted his own declaration attaching the
Settlement Agreement as an exhibit. Confidential R. 1-11. The district court entered an order to
seal Ward's declaration the day after it was filed. R. 65-66.
On May 17, 2018, Primera filed its memorandum in opposition to Ward's motion for
summary judgment. R. 67-74. In support of its Opposition, Primera submitted a declaration of its
counsel in the underlying lawsuit, Gary Slette, attaching as exhibits email correspondence between
himself and the Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney's Office and email correspondence between
himself and Roark. R. 75-82. Primera also submitted the declaration of its agent, Dustin Dean,
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who participated in the settlement negotiations in the underlying lawsuit. R. 83-85. Ward filed his
reply memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment on May 24, 2018. R. 88-94.
Following a hearing on June 1, 2018, the district court granted summary judgment in
Ward's favor in its July 20, 2018 Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Memorandum Decision"). R. 95-103. The district court dismissed the
breach of contract cause of action on the grounds that Roark acted without express, implied, or
apparent authority when he disclosed confidential terms of the Settlement Agreement to the Cassia
County Prosecuting Attorney, and thus there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether Ward breached the Settlement Agreement. R. 98-102. Based on this ruling, the district
court determined it was unnecessary to decide the enforceability of the Settlement Agreement's
liquidated damages provision. R. 102.
On August 21, 2018, Primera moved for reconsideration of the district court's
Memorandum Decision. R. 104-110. Ward filed his opposition to Primera's motion for
reconsideration on September 5, 2018. R. 111-115. Primera filed its reply memorandum on
September 10, 2018. R. 116-119.
Following a hearing on September 12, 2018, the district court denied Primera's motion for
reconsideration in its September 13, 2018 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiffs Motion for
Reconsideration ("Reconsideration Order"). R. 120-126. The district court reiterated its prior
holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Roark acted without express or implied
authority, and therefore summary judgment was proper. R. 123-125. The district court did not
analyze apparent authority because neither Primera nor Ward raised arguments based on apparent
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authority. R. 123. Primera argued solely on an express authority theory, while Ward rebutted both
express and implied theories. Id. Judgment was entered on October 24, 2018. R. 127-129. Primera
filed its Notice of Appeal on December 4, 2018. R. 130-138.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the district court erred in finding that Roark acted outside the scope of his express
authority by disclosing terms of the Settlement Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia
County without Ward's knowledge, authorization, or direction.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standards of Review
1.

Summary Judgment

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the same
standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Liberty Bankers Life
Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport, and Toole, 159 Idaho 679, 689, 365 P.3d 1033, 1039
(2016). Summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw~" I.R.C.P. 56(a).
To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must submit more than just conclusory
assertions that an issue of material fact exists." Nw. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho
835, 838, 41 P .3d 263, 266 (2002). "Summary judgment is appropriate where the nonmoving party
bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to the party's case." Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410,
179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008).
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Whether facts giving rise to an agency relationship exist is a question of fact, "however,
whether a given set of facts are sufficient to constitute an agency relationship is a question of law
appropriate for this Court's consideration." Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Property Owners
Association, Inc., 162 Idaho 317,330,396 P.2d 1199, 1212 (2017).

2.

Motion to Reconsider

When a district court decides a motion to reconsider, "the district court must apply the
same standard of review that the court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012). When this
Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration, it uses the
same standard of review the lower court used in deciding the motion for reconsideration. Liberty,
159 Idaho at 686, 365 P .3d at 1040.

B.

The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Ward.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Ward because

Roark acted outside the scope of his authority when he disclosed terms of the Settlement
Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney for Cassia County. Because Roark acted outside the scope
of his authority, Ward cannot be held vicariously liable for Roark's alleged breach of the
Settlement Agreement.
"The elements of a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b)
the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages."
Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 158 Idaho 846, 850, 353 P.3d 1080, 1084 (2015) (citing
Mossel/ Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,278,297 P.3d 232,241 (2013)). Implicit
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in these elements is that the breach must have been committed by a party to the contract. Primera
does not allege Ward personally breached the Settlement Agreement. R. 14, 49, 59. Instead,
Primera alleges Roark breached the Settlement Agreement while acting within his scope of
authority as Ward's attorney. Id.
"An agent is a person who has been authorized to act on behalf of a principal towards the
performance of a specific task or series of tasks." Humphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728,735,366
P.3d 1088, 1095 (2016).
An agency relationship is created through the actions of the principal who either:
(1) expressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which are
necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3)
apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party
indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.
Id. Agency relationships are limited in scope to the authority granted by the principal. Id. "Only

acts by the agent that are within the scope of the agency relationship affect the principal's legal
liability." Id.
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, Ward did not expressly or impliedly grant Roark
authority to disclose the terms of the Settlement Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney.
1.

Primera has Waived Arguments Regarding Implied or Apparent Authority.

An appellant must identify its claimed assignments of error with particularity and
specificity. PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho 33,423 P.3d 454,459 (2018). If an appellant
does not "assert his assignments of error with particularity and to support his position with
sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by this Court." Id.
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"This Court will not consider general attacks on the district court's conclusions absent specific
reference to evidentiary or legal errors." Id. "Arguments of this type are deemed to have been
waived." Id.
In its Memorandum Decision, the district court determined Roark acted without express,
apparent, or applied authority when he disclosed terms of the Settlement Agreement to the
Prosecuting Attorney. R. 98-108. At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, Primera's
counsel clarified: "I don't think I'm arguing apparent authority at all. My focus is on express
authority." Transcript 7 at 16:23-25. In its Reconsideration Order, the district court determined
that Roark acted without express or implied authority. R. 124-125. The district court analyzed
arguments based on implied authority even though Primera had "appear[ ed] to argue strictly based
on an express authority theory." R. 123.
On appeal, Primera similarly appears to argue strictly based on an express authority theory.
The issue on appeal broadly assigns error to the district court's finding that Roark "was not acting
within the scope of his authority," but does not specify whether Primera contends Roark was acting
pursuant to express, implied, or apparent authority. Appellant's Brief 3. The Memorandum
Decision and Reconsideration Order include specific findings with respect to each type of
authority. R. 98-102, 123-125. Broadly assigning error to the district court's findings regarding
Roark's authority is a general attack on the district court's conclusions without specific reference
to legal errors.
The only type of authority specifically identified in Primera's brief is express authority.
Appellant's Brief 3, 6. Because Primera has not asserted, with particularity and specificity, any
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assignments of error based on apparent or implied authority, any arguments based on these two
types of authority have been waived.

2.

The District Court Did Not Err in Determining Roark Acted Without
Express Authority.

"Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name." Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Center, LLC, 161 Idaho 127, 131,
384 P.3d 374,378 (2016). "Express authority is articulated between the parties." Podolan v. Idaho
Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937,944,854 P.2d 280,287 (1993). Declarations of the alleged

agent, standing alone, do not establish that the principal has conferred express authority. Muniz v.
Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ct. App. 1989).

There is no dispute that Ward did not ask or authorize Roark to disclose terms of the
Settlement Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney. Confidential R. 2. In fact, Ward first learned
about the disclosure when this lawsuit was filed against him approximately two months after Roark
sent his letter to the Prosecuting Attorney. Confidential R. 2-3. Because Ward did not explicitly
grant Roark authority to disclose terms of the Settlement Agreement, Roark acted without express
I

authority in doing so.
Primera does not argue that Ward directed Roark to disclose terms of the Settlement
Agreement and has not submitted any evidence to this effect. Primera argues that because Ward
retained Roark as his counsel in the criminal matter, any actions taken by Ward in connection with
that matter were within the scope of his authority.
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In support of this argument, Primera relies on Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 6.43 .1, which
defines the term "scope of authority" and states:
Conduct is within the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the agent is
engaged in the duties that the agent was asked or expected to perform and relates
to those duties. It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly
authorized by the principal to bring it within the scope of the agent's authority.
Conduct for the benefit of the principal that is incidental to, customarily connected
with, or reasonably necessary for the performance of such duties is within the scope
of the agent's authority.
IDJI 6.43.1. This definition is inapplicable to express authority to the extent it does not require a
particular act to be expressly authorized by the principal to be within the scope of authority. As
the name suggests, express authority requires express authorization by the principal.
The definition in Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 6.43.1 is consistent with Idaho case law
defining implied authority, which does not require express authorization and instead only requires
that the conduct be necessary to complete that which was expressly authorized. See Humphries,
159 Idaho at 735, 366 P.3d at 1095. In other words, an agent has express authority to take action
that has been expressly authorized and has implied authority to take actions necessary and proper
to complete that which has been expressly authorized. See id.
Thus, Primera's argument that Roark had "express authority" to disclose terms of the
Settlement Agreement because he had express authority to act as his attorney is based on an
incorrect and overly broad definition of express authority. This argument is based on implied
authority, not express. Primera has waived arguments based on implied authority because its brief
only refers to express authority. Further, Primera only raised arguments based on express authority
in connection with its motion for reconsideration. R. 123, Transcript 7 at 16:23-25. Because
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Primera has waived arguments based on implied authority, it cannot raise arguments based on
implied authority under the incorrect label of "express authority."
There is no dispute that Ward did not explicitly grant Roark authority to disclose the terms
of the Settlement Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney, and therefore the district court did not
err in determining that Roark acted without express authority.
3.

Even if Primera has Not Waived Arguments Regarding Implied Authority,
the District Court Did Not Err in Determining Roark Acted Without Implied
Authority.

Primera has not made any specific assignment of error based on a theory of implied
authority. The only type of authority specifically identified in Primera's brief is express authority.
Although there is no specific reference to implied authority, some of Primera's arguments appear
to be based on a theory of implied authority. Even if this Court determines Primera has not waived
arguments based on implied authority, the district court properly concluded that Roark acted
without implied authority when he disclosed terms of the confidential Settlement Agreement to
the Prosecuting Attorney.
a.

Although Primera does not specifically refer to implied authority, its
arguments are based on a definition of "scope of authority" that is
broader than the scope of implied authority, as defined by the Idaho
Supreme Court.

"Implied authority refers to that authority which is necessary, usual, and proper to
accomplish or perform the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal." American
West Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746,753,316 P.3d 662,669 (2013), see also IDJI

6.40.3. Although Idaho case law limits implied authority to that which is necessary, usual, and
proper to accomplish the express authority that has been granted, Primera argues-without specific
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reference to implied authority-that the scope of agency essentially extends to all actions by the
agent so long as the agent is not doing something totally and completely unrelated to what he or
she was expressly authorized to do.
For example, citing to King v. H.J. McNeel, Inc., 94 Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324 (1971),
Primera argues that a real estate agent would be acting outside the scope of his authority if he
represented a client in court. Appellant's Brief 7. The King Court held that a realtor's
representations regarding boundaries and quantity of land are generally binding on the principal
even if the realtor acted without express authority. King, 94 Idaho at 446,489 P.2d at 1326. This
holding has no bearing on the scope of an attorney's express or implied authority. Further, the
holding in King in no way supports Primera's argument that an agent acts within the scope of his
authority so long as his actions are not completely unrelated to that which the principal has
expressly authorized.
Primera also relies on Thornton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103,257 P.2d 238 (1953) in support of
this same argument. In Thornton, the operator of a garage rode as the passenger in a car driven by
his acquaintance who had been in the garage at the time the operator noticed he needed to procure
parts from a nearby town. Id. at 105,257 P.2d at 239. The acquaintance worked as "a businessman
in Malad." Id. On the way back, the acquaintance's car collided with a truck. Id. at 106,257 P.2d
at 240. The only issue on appeal pertaining to agency was whether the district court erred in
submitting to the jury the question of whether the relationship between the garage operator and his
acquaintance was that of host and gratuitous guest or principal and agent. Id. The Court held the
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question presented an issue of fact and the garage operator was not prejudiced by having the
question of agency submitted to the jury. Id. at 108,257 P.2d 241-42.
Primera relies on Thornton to support its argument that negligently operating an
employer's vehicle is within a driver's scope of authority, but listing his employer's home for sale
is outside the driver's scope of authority. 2 Appellant's Brief 7. Ward does not dispute that a driver
is generally not authorized to act as his employer's realtor and a realtor is generally not authorized
to act as his client's attorney. However, these analogies are irrelevant for several reasons. First, the
cases Primera relies on are factually distinguishable from the case at bar and simply have no
bearing on the scope of an attorney's express or implied authority. Second, neither case involves
a putative agent's breach of a contract entered into by the principal, as is the case here. In fact,
Primera has not cited any case law supporting the argument that a principal can be held liable for
breach of contract if the alleged breach was caused by the principal's unauthorized agent. Third,
the analogies Primera draws from these two cases are unsupported by the holdings therein. Neither
King nor Thornton support the argument that an agent acts within the scope of his authority so

long as he is not doing something completely far afield from his job duties, such as a driver acting
as a realtor or a realtor acting as an attorney. Fourth, these analogies are unsupported by Idaho case
law that actually addresses the scope of implied authority. "Implied authority refers to that
authority which is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform the express authority
delegated to the agent by the principal." American West Enterprises, Inc., 155 Idaho at 753,316

2

The driver in Thornton was not an employee of the garage and was operating his own
vehicle. Thornton, 74 Idaho at105, 257 P.2d at 239-240.
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P.3d at 669. This definition is markedly narrower than the definition Primera makes by way of
analogy.

b.

Retention of an attorney, standing alone, does not establish that all
actions taken by the attorney on behalf of the client are within the
attorney's scope of authority.

Primera's arguments are not supported by Idaho case law analyzing an attorney's scope of
authority. Primera argues that because Ward retained Roark as his attorney, any actions taken by
Roark while acting as his attorney were within the scope of his authority. Citing to Devault v.
Steven L. Herndon, a Professional Association, 107 Idaho 1, 684 P.2d 978 (1984), Primera argues

that "[l]itigants freely choose their attorneys and cannot avoid the consequences of the attorney's
action," and therefore an attorney's actions, even if improper, are within his or her scope of
authority. Appellant's Brief. 8-9. The Devault decision is clearly distinguishable from the case at
bar. In Devault, the attorney failed to comply with the district court's discovery order, which led
to the dismissal of the client's lawsuit as a sanction for the violation. Id. at 1-2, 684 P.2d at 978-79.
The client argued he should not be penalized for his attorney's failure to comply with discovery
orders. Id. at 2, 684 P.2d at 979. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's order of dismissal
under the broad discretion granted to the trial court to issue sanctions for violations of discovery
orders. Id. The Devault opinion includes no holdings or analysis on theories of agency and is thus
inapplicable to the case at bar. Roark's actions do not invoke Ward's duties under the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure as a party to a civil action, but instead involve an alleged breach of contract by
his attorney for actions Ward did not know of or authorize.
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Under Idaho law, retention of an attorney does not automatically bring all actions taken by
the attorney on behalf of the client within the attorney's scope of authority. For example, in
Cameron Sales, Inc. v. Klemish, 93 Idaho 451,463 P.2d 287 (1970), an attorney representing both

a co-op supply company and a bank purported to enter into a settlement agreement on behalf of
both during a meeting with another company, Cameron Sales, relating to repayment and
securitization ofKlemish's debts. Id. at 453-54, 463 P.2d at 289-90. The meeting was attended by
Klemish, a representative and attorney for Cameron sales, a representative of the co-op supply
company, and the attorney for the bank and co-op supply company. Id. No representative of the
bank was present. Id. This Court held "there was no showing that the attorney had the actual
authority to compromise or settle the claim on behalf of the bank." Id. at 455, 463 P.2d at 291.
Although an attorney generally has implied authority to enter into stipulations with respect to
procedural or remedial matters, this implied authority "does not extend to the doing of acts which
will result in the surrender or giving up of any substantial right of the client." Id. A representative
of the bank did not give the attorney authority to settle the claim, the bank did not later ratify the
attorney's actions, and there was no showing that the bank had knowledge of the agreement. Id. at
455-56, 463 P.2d at 291-92. Based on these factors, this Court determined the attorney lacked
authority to bind the bank to the agreement. Id.
More specifically, an attorney must have actual authority, whether express or implied, to
settle a claim on behalf of his or her client. Caballero v. Wikse, 140 Idaho 329, 332, 92 P .3d 1076,
1079 (2004). Following his termination from the Idaho Department of Welfare, Wikse filed three
wrongful termination actions against the State and its officials. Id. at 330, 92 P.3d at 1077, 92 P.3d
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at 1077. A global settlement agreement was reached at mediation. Id. at 331, 92 P .3d at 1078. At
the beginning of the mediation, the parties were told that a representative with settlement authority
was required to be in attendance throughout the mediation. Id. After the parties reached an
agreement on non-monetary issues and were nearing an agreement on money damages, Wikse left
the mediation and told his attorney words to the effect of "I'm leaving, Jim, you handle it." Id. at
331-32, 92 P.3d at 1078-79. His attorney accepted the State's counteroffer on monetary damages.
Id. A settlement agreement was not executed at the mediation. Id. Wikse's attorney informed him

of the agreed upon terms shortly after the mediation. Id. About a month later, Wikse told his
attorney he was unable to settle on those terms. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court held that there was
substantial, competent evidence to support a finding of express actual authority based on Wikse's
statement that his attorney "handle it" coupled with his understanding that a representative with
settlement authority had to be present at the mediation at all times. Id. at 333, 92 P.3d at 1080.
The facts of this case support a finding that Roark acted without actual authority when he
disclosed terms of the Settlement Agreement to the Prosecuting Attorney without Ward's direction
or authorization. Similar to the bank in Klemish, Ward was not privy to the communications
between Roark and the Prosecuting Attorney and had not given him authority to disclose terms of
the Settlement Agreement. Confidential R. 2-3. Also similar to the bank in Klemish, Ward did not
ratify or have any knowledge ofRoark's actions. Ward did not know that Roark had sent the letter
to the Prosecuting Attorney until this lawsuit was filed against him. Confidential R. 2-3. After the
underlying lawsuit was dismissed, Ward asked Roark if it would be possible to have the criminal
lawsuit dismissed. Confidential R. 2. Unlike the statements in Wikse, Ward did not ask Roark about
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the possible resolution of his case in the context of a mediation or settlement negotiations. Ward
did not direct or authorize Roark to settle the criminal case on his behalf, let alone disclose terms
of the confidential Settlement Agreement in doing so. Simply inquiring with counsel about the
possible resolution of a lawsuit is not a grant of settlement authority, and it is by no means a grant
of authority to disclose confidential terms of a settlement agreement.
The Idaho Supreme Court's definition of implied authority further supports the district
court's finding that Roark acted without implied authority when he disclosed terms of the
Settlement Agreement without Ward's authorization. "Implied authority refers to that authority
which is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform the express authority delegated to
the agent by the principal." American West Enterprises, Inc, 155 Idaho at 753,316 P.3d at 669.
Roark represented Ward in the underlying lawsuit and signed the Settlement Agreement.
Confidential R. 2, 9. Roark was therefore aware of the confidentiality provision. There can be no
genuine dispute that it is not "necessary, usual, and proper" for an attorney to knowingly violate
the terms of his client's ongoing contractual obligations, at least without first discussing this
proposed violation with the client and obtaining express authority to do so. Roark never had any
such discussion with Ward and never obtained his express authority to disclose terms of the
confidential Settlement Agreement. Because Roark's actions were not "necessary, usual, and
proper," he acted outside the scope of his implied authority as Ward's attorney.
Thus, the facts of this case support the district court's finding that Roark acted without
express or implied authority when he disclosed terms of the Settlement Agreement without Ward's
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authorization, direction, or knowledge. The facts underlying this determination are not in dispute,
and therefore summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Ward.

IV.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Ward respectfully requests that this Court award him costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code§§ 12-107, 12-120(3) and the Settlement Agreement. Confidential R. 8.

V.

CONCLUSION

Ward respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Memorandum Decision and
Reconsideration Order and affirm the Judgment dismissing Primera's Complaint with prejudice.
DATED this 8th day of May, 2019.
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